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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
TAXATION--STOCKHOLDER-TRANSFEREE LIABILITY:
ORDINARY OR CAPITAL LOSS?
On dissolution of a corporation, the stockholders receivedliquidating dividends, upon which they properly paid capitalgains tax. In a later year a judgment was rendered against the
corporation which was paid by the stockholders as transferees of
the corporate assets. Held (6-3): Such payments must be treated
as capital losses, not ordinary losses, in the year of payment.
Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 73 S. Ct. 71 (1952).
Each stockholder-transferee of the assets of a liquidated
corporation is severally liable for the unpaid debts of the corpo-
ration, as if he were a trustee, but this liability is limited in
amount to the liquidation dividends he receives. Phillips-JonesCorp. v. Parmley, 302 U. S. 233, 235 (1937); Kooh v. UnitedStates, 138 F. 2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1943). The Code provides
that liquidation dividends are to be treated as capital gains orlosses. INT. REv. CODE §§ 115(c), 117(a). However, there is noprovision which expressly prescribes how a payment of a corpo-
rate debt by a stockholder-transferee is to be treated.
Early decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals permitted suchpayments to be treated as reductions of the previously receivedliquidation dividends, so that the taxpayer could reopen his earlier
tax return, recompute his tax liability for that earlier year, and
collect a refund if one were due. 0. B. Barker, 3 B. T. A. 1180(1926); Benjamin Paschal O'Neal, 18 B. T. A. 1036 (1930). Butthis practice was expressly changed in John T. Furlong, 45 B. T. A.362 (1941), on the ground of a Supreme Court dictum stating thatincome received under a "claim of right" is fully taxable in theyear of receipt, and if the taxpayer must later repay all or part of
this income, the loss must be treated as a deduction in the year of
repayment. North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 424(1932); see also United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590 (1951). This
alone, however, does not determine whether such deduction is a
capital or an ordinary loss.
Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F. 2d 299 (3d Cir. 1950), differ-ing from the principal case only in that a corporate tax deficiency
was involved rather than a judgment, held that such a payment
results in an ordinary loss under nt. Rev. Code § 23(e) (2). The
court strictly adhered to the theory which treats the single year
as a separate unit for tax purposes, and would not consider the
nature of the liquidation distributions in determining the char-
acter of the loss. It then concluded that the loss did not fall within
the statutory definition of a "loss from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset." INT. REV. CODE § 117(a).
RECENT DECISIONS
In the principal case, the second circuit expressly disagreed
with- the Switlik case, supra, holding the loss to be a capital
one. Commissioner v. Arrowsmith, 193 F. 2d 734: (2d Cir. 1952).
The court stated simply that the loss was "directly related to and
would not have existed except for" the previous capital distribu-
tions, so by considering the two transactions as "tied together,"
the losses "show up as arising out of a ' sale or exchange'." Supra
at 735. In affirming, the Supreme Court stated that the principle
of treating a single year as a separate tax unit is not violated by
considering the events of previous years in determining the nature
of the current year's loss. 73 S. Ct. 71, 73. Both courts in the in-
stant case broadly construed "sale or exchange," the Supreme
Court concluding with little explanation that the loss in question
fell "squarely within" the statutory definition of capital losses.
The dissenters in the Supreme Court took the position that
the single year concept should be strictly applied, the result being
no capital transaction since there was no sale or exchange of any
capital asset within the taxable year.
It has been stated that a fundamental reason for the "single
year rule" is its capacity to "produce revenue ascertainable, and
payable to the government, at regular intervals." Burnet v.
Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 lU. S. 359, 365 (1931). Considering
this purpose, it does not appear to be a violation of the rule to
allow a court to examine an earlier related transaction in order
to help to determine the nature of a subsequent payment, since
it would not entail a reopening or recomputation of the tax-
payer's previous return.
Admittedly, the instant case may be said to reach an equitable
result. The loss, if viewed realistically from a transactional ap-
proach, does appear to be in effect a reduction of the prior capital
gain. However, the equities involved ought not to obscure the
fact that taxation is essentially a matter of statute. It has been
stated that "not every gain growing out of a transaction concern-
ing capital assets is allowed the benefits of the capital gains
tax provision. Those are limited by definition to gains from 'the
sale or exchange' of capital assets." Dbbson v. Commissioner, 321
U. S. 231 (194). The taxable year in the instant case contains
neither a sale nor an exchange of any capital asset.
Thus, an examination of the prior returns shows only that
the loss in question was sustained because of a previous capital
transaction. This alone does not seem to require the conclusion
that the payment of the judgment is itself a "loss from the sale.
or exchange of a capital asset" in the present taxable year. Al-
though the instant case appears to reach an equitable result, it
does not seem to be fully justified under the present statutory
language. Jerome D. Adner
